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Abstract:
On January 1
st, 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) has started operating a common monetary
policy on behalf of the 11 founding members of the European Monetary Union (EMU). There is a
legitimate concern about the practicalities and the effectiveness of the decision-making process inside
the ECB. This paper addresses this concern by using standard measures of voting power (as well as
some of their extensions) to quantify what is likely to be the relative influence of individual EMU
members on common monetary-policy decisions. Postulating the a priori formation of certain voting
coalitions, it shows, among others, that the 6-member Executive Board (EB) can claim, in certain
circumstances, voting power of up to 66%, but policy impact of only up to 25%, i.e. respectively
much more and much less than its number of votes would imply (6 out of 17, i.e. 35.3%). Also, it is
not at all clear that the 6 countries which managed to elect one of their nationals at the EB have an
interest in pressing the 6 EB members to vote along national rather than EMU-wide lines, or that
EMU member countries with no representative at the EB are necessarily worse off (from a voting-
power perspective) when each EB member focuses on his or her own country’s developments, rather
than on EMU-wide aggregates..
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st, 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) has duly started operating a common
monetary policy on behalf of the 11 members of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Some
financial commentators have already realised that the specificity of the ECB's decision-making
process may affect the effectiveness of its monetary policy. W. Münchau contends in Financial
Times (1998b) that “one of the potential weaknesses of the new arrangements is the possibility of
national coalition building. Like-minded central bank governors might collude to push their national
interests”, and in particular that “the national governors' majority could make collusion tactics
feasible”.
A number of researchers have also expressed some concern about the details and practicalities of
the decision-making process inside the ECB, or about whether it is likely to satisfy the “median”
voter in the EMU (Alesina & Grilli, 1991; Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi, 1998; Eichengreen,
1991; Von Hagen, 1998). Others have constructed theoretical models of monetary policy under
EMU which capture the specific features of collective decision-making by committee members
faced with heterogeneous incentives (De Grauwe, Dewachter & Aksoy, 1998; Tarkka, 1997;
Vaubel, 1999; Von Hagen, 1995 and 1998; Von Hagen & Süppel, 1994).
There is clearly a legitimate worry about the extent to which, given the ECB’s institutional
structure, the potentially conflicting interests of EMU member countries may adversely influence
the inflationary performance of their common monetary policy. This paper addresses this concern
by using standard measures of voting power (as well as some of their extensions) to quantify each
EMU member-country’s theoretical “power” to influence a given vote on monetary policy, such as
the ones which periodically take place inside the ECB to set the level of its policy instrument.
Such an approach makes it possible, for a number of plausible patterns of coalition formation
among EMU members, to quantify explicitly the a priori influence of each EMU member country
on monetary-policy decisions. That influence is made dependent, first, on whether members of the
ECB’s Executive Board (EB) are assumed to care for EMU averages or about national variables,
and second, in the latter case, on whether or not a given EMU member has managed to have one of
its nationals elected as an EB member, as well as on the identity of all other EB members.
This analysis of EMU-wide monetary policy in terms of voting power allows us to cast new light on
a number of important empirical questions, among which:Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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• how desirable is it, for EMU member countries, to encourage EB members to adopt a European
perspective in their monetary-policy deliberations, and is there any difference in this respect
between the 6 countries with one of their nationals at the EB and the 5 other countries ?
• how justifiable is the claim that “big” countries (e.g. in terms of relative GDP) have significantly
more influence on common European monetary-policy decisions than “small” countries, in
particular when they shift their a priori stance ?
• what are the most-desirable and least-desirable patterns of a priori coalition formation for each
EMU member country, and in which way are they influenced by the most- and least-desirable
patterns of coalition formation for all other EMU members ? 
1
The paper is structured as follows: some essential features of the measures of power used in the
computations are outlined in section II; those institutional characteristics of the ECB which are
relevant for the analysis are described in section III; section IV introduces some working
assumptions, and constructs the scenarios on which the simulations are to be based; simulation
results are presented and analysed in section V; section VI concludes.
II. MEASURES OF POWER
An abundant theoretical literature exists on how to measure a voter’s “power” in a group where
decisions have to be taken collectively
2. The purpose of this section is only to describe the main
defining characteristics of “voting power” in general, and to introduce the various concepts which
will be used in section V to analyse the influence of EMU member countries on the ECB’s
monetary-policy decisions.
                                               
1 A companion paper (Mangano, 1999) extends the analysis to future EMU enlargement(s), and discusses, among
others, the voting-power consequences (hence the relative desirability) of various potential EMU enlargement(s) on
current EMU members, which may determine the latter’s relative enthusiasm or reluctance to accept some
candidates rather than (or together with) others.
2 The interested reader is referred to Banzhaf (1965), Deegan and Packel (1983), Holler (1982), Holler and Packel
(1983), W. Lucas (1983, 1988), Packel and Deegan (1980), Shapley and Shubik (1954) or Straffin (1983, 1988) for
more detailed considerations.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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Contrary to preliminary intuition, voting shares are generally a poor indicator of voting power, or to
put it in W. Lucas’s (1983) words, “the ability to cast more ballots does not in itself necessarily
increase one’s power nor does it so in a directly proportional way” 
3. Instead, what matters in a
collective voting body is the a priori influence of a member on decisions to be taken by vote;
accordingly, that member’s “voting power” is measured by the a priori probability that he will be
“crucial” in the determination of the outcome of an arbitrary binary vote
4. That measure of power
tries to answer the question: How likely is each member of the voting body to “make a difference”
to a voting outcome ? 
5
The main practical distinction between the three indices presented below lies precisely in their
interpretation of what “crucial” means, with their different definitions being dependent on the
concepts of Minimum Winning Coalition (MWC) and Winning Decisive Set (WDS).
II.1. THE SHAPLEY & SHUBIK INDEX (SSI)
The Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI) abstracts itself from the two concepts of MWC and WDS. It
simply considers all possible permutations of voters in a voting game, and counts towards a
member’s voting power those permutations where he is “pivotal”, i.e. where he turns them from
losing into winning ones when he joins them. For the SSI, “crucial” is therefore taken as meaning
pivotal.
Consider a simple majority voting game  = n M (N, W), where N is the set of n players
{ } n i , , , , 2 , 1 K K  and W is the set of “Winning Coalitions”, those (unordered) groupings S of s
players ( n s £ ) whose combined votes sum up to at least the quota needed for a decision to be
taken. Voter i’s power according to the SSI is then given by:
                                               
3 W. Lucas (1983), p. 184. See the discussion on “weak monotonicity” below (subsection II.3).
4 The probabilistic approach to measuring voting power is advocated by Widgrén (1994b) on the grounds that
“although it does not model the players’ behaviour, it does measure each player's potential abilities to change the
result alone” (p. 1154). It can also be interpreted as yielding the equilibrium distribution of power in an infinitely-
repeated voting game, where the identity of the voters (and hence their number) is constant, but where the subject of
the vote is random.
5 For obvious reasons, and whatever the index used, if the case arises where a voter (or an indivisible group of voters)
has enough votes to reach (or exceed) the required majority on its own, it is described as a “dictator”; by extension,
when a voter (or an indivisible group of voters) turns out to have enough votes for a quota to be unattainable without














or the total number of his “pivots” divided by the total number of permutations
6.
One of the SSI’s potentially unpleasant characteristics is that to calculate each participant’s power,
it takes into account the specific order in which they cast their vote; another is that it relies on the
assumption that the individual probability distributions over all voting outcomes are homogeneous
across voters. The meaning and consequences of the latter assumption are discussed, and a
relaxation of it suggested, in subsection II.4.
II.2. THE STANDARDISED BANZHAF INDEX (SBI)
The Standardised Banzhaf Index (SBI) restricts its attention to MWCs. Consider again the simple
majority voting game  = n M (N, W) described in subsection II.1. MWCs are then defined as
Winning Coalitions where at least one voter is “essential”, i.e. where that voter would “swing” them
from winning to losing ones if she left them. Formally, for an arbitrary coalition S to belong to the
set m of MWCs requires:
{ } {} { } W i S S i W S S ˇ - ˛ $ ˛ ￿ ˛ : , m .
The SBI then counts towards a player’s voting power those MWCs where she is “crucial”, in the
sense of being essential; accordingly, voter i’s power as measured by the SBI is given by the









(where  ￿  denotes the cardinality), or in other words, voter i’s share of all possible critical
”swings” 
7.
                                               
6 The formula takes into account the fact that there are (s – 1)! orders in which the other s – 1 players belonging to S
can enter S before i, and (n – s)! orders in which the remaining n – s players can be added to S to form N.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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It is again worth mentioning two of the SBI’s defining features. First, in a symmetric way to the
SSI, it assumes that the voters’ individual probability distributions over all voting outcomes are
independent from each-other (also see subsection II.4). Second, as the next subsection illustrates, it
is likely to overestimate a voter’s influence on voting outcomes because of its reliance on MWCs.
II.3. THE HOLLER & PACKEL INDEX (HPI)
By definition, a coalition can be a MWC for one or several of its members, but not necessarily for
all of them. Those voters for whom the coalition is not a MWC are called “dummy voters”, or “free
riders” 
8; the Holler-Packel Index (HPI) precisely eliminates the MWCs in which there are free
riders by only considering the subset  m m ˛ D  of W where all voters are essential (they can then each
be described as “decisive”), which is the set of WDSs.
Formally, for S to belong to  D m  requires:
{ } {} { } S i W i S W S S D ˛ " ˇ - ˛ ￿ ˛ , m .












i.e. his share of the total number of “swings” in the subset  D m  of all W.
9
Widgrén (1994a) points out that the HPI is a more accurate indicator of the policy impact of each
particular voter
10. The SBI, instead, is likely to overestimate a voter’s influence on policies by
potentially counting towards her voting power several coalitions in which she is essential, but which
all lead to an identical policy outcome, since they differ only by the addition of one or more dummy
voter(s).
                                                                                                                                                           
7 When discussing two other potentially interesting indices (Coleman’s “initiative” and “blocking” power indices),
Nurmi (1981) points out that the SBI is a “proportional transformation of either one of [them]” (p. 206).
8 These coalition members are described as such because, although their vote is not decisive for the outcome, they still
get a positive share of the payoff, since they are of the same opinion than the MWC on the issue at stake.
9 For original axiomatic properties of the HPI, see Deegan & Packel (1979) and Holler & Packel (1983).
10 The discussion of the simulations’ results in section Erreur! Source du renvoi introuvable. will take into
consideration this property of the HPI.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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As a matter of fact, the following relationship can be shown to hold between SBI and HPI:
( ) i i i FRI HPI SBI ￿ + - = p p 1 , (4)
where FRI is a Free Rider Index given by:
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Furthermore, Peters (1996) stresses that, when voting power is measured through HPI, it is perfectly
possible for players with fewer votes to exert more power than players with more votes, while both
the SSI and SBI are “always weakly monotonic in the voting weights” 
11.
It is difficult to determine whether or not one of the discussed indices is “more appropriate” than the
others for the purposes of this paper; however, their axiomatic and probabilistic interpretations offer
a few suggestions
12. Intuitively, the homogeneity assumption sustaining the SSI looks a little
extreme, but for games with a relatively large number of players, it approximates the case in which
each player has a fair chance of convincing other players of its point of view, or in which players
have a relatively homogeneous background. On the other hand, while for larger games, the SBI and
HPI approximate situations where convincing each-other is very difficult (or where the players have
relatively different backgrounds), for smaller games, the independence assumption they depend
upon seems more realistic. As for the SSI's reliance on the order in which voters cast their vote, and
thus its use of permutations (in contrast to the SBI's and HPI's use of combinations), Straffin (1988)
                                               
11 Peters (1996), p. 228. See Brams & Fishburn (1994) for an illustration [and Fishburn & Brams (1994) for a
theoretical justification] of the possible inverse relationship between (relative) weight and “bargaining power”, in a
context where only Winning Decisive Sets are formed.
12 See Straffin (1983), section 3, or Straffin (1988) for a detailed argument.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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argues that “the permutation–combination distinction between the indices is illusory, because both
[the SSI and SBI] indices can be derived from a simple probability model of voting in which order
plays no part”, so that “the important distinction between the indices has to do with the degree of
statistical independence among the voters” (p. 74)
 13.
As far as those basic indices of voting power are concerned, therefore, an opinion on their
appropriateness ultimately seems to rest, first, on whether we are modelling a “large” EMU or a
more restricted one; second, on whether we think that a priori, the Central Bankers involved in each
of those scenarios are more likely, when discussing the course of European monetary policy, to be
easily swayed or not by their colleagues’ views; and third, on whether we wish to measure each
country's actual impact on EMU monetary-policy decisions, rather than its theoretical voting power.
In section V, numerical results will anyway be presented for all of these three indices (including
their extensions discussed below), taking into account these theoretical considerations.
II.4. EXTENSIONS OF BASIC INDICES
Some of the specific features of monetary-policy voting in the ECB are not properly captured by the
underlying assumptions of the original indices; a few refinements may help to correct this
inadequacy.
Both the assumptions of perfect homogeneity (SSI) and of perfect independence (SBI and HPI) of
individual probability distributions over all voting outcomes imply that, in the computation of the
standard measures of voting power presented above, each coalition is considered as likely to occur
as any other
14. This, however, does not seem to satisfy our modelling requirements accurately:
given the specific subject of voting we are attempting to analyse (the general direction of European
monetary policy), the probability of each coalition forming itself is instead very likely to depend on
a number of endogenous or exogenous factors (further discussed in section IV) which affect the
                                               
13 Another way of gauging voting-power indices is devised by Felsenthal & Machover (1995), who propose a number
of “intuitively compelling postulates that any reasonable index of voting power ought to satisfy” (p. 195), leading to
three “paradoxes” with respect to which each index can be evaluated. Their results suggest that the SSI is the most
theoretically-rigorous (since none of the paradoxes applies to it), while the SBI and HPI should, on theoretical
grounds, be respectively “regarded as seriously flawed” and “disqualified as a reasonable measure of relative voting
power” (p. 225). Turnovec (1997) also examines the compliance of these 3 indices (plus 2 related others) with 5
axioms, and finds that the SSI satisfies all of them, while the SBI and HPI fail to satisfy one, respectively two of
these axioms.
14 For a proof and an illustration, see Straffin (1983), pp. 298-300.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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preferences of each of its potential members. We therefore need to relax those assumptions slightly,
and introduce “partial” homogeneity into the computation of those 3 indices
15.
A flexible way of differentiating between various potential coalitions with respect to their
probability of forming is by using the concept of “policy distance”. Assume that all n voters can be
distributed along j sequential partitions (j > 2)
16 according to their expected stance on the policy to
be adopted or rejected by vote (e.g. j = 5, with the partitions being “strongly against – against –
neutral – in favour – strongly in favour”)
17. The (absolute value of the) number of partitions
between any two voters a and b,  b a j j - , is taken as a measure of the “policy distance” separating
them; it thus ranges from a minimum of 0 if the two are in the same partition, to a maximum of j-1
if the two are at opposite extremes of the partitions spectrum, i.e.  1 0 - £ - £ j j j b a . If that
distance is below (or equal to) a pre-defined threshold, a and b are said to be “mutually acceptable”
as partners in a joint coalition, and thus any coalition in which they both appear (as well as any
other voter who is acceptable to all the other coalition members) is given a positive a priori
probability of forming; by contrast, a coalition in which the distance between any two voters is
above the threshold will carry a zero a priori probability of forming 
18.
                                               
15 The refinement discussed below—and subsequently used in this paper's computations—is based on suggestions by
Rattinger (1981); another refinement, mentioned in footnote 18 but not introduced in this version of the paper, is
advocated by Widgrén (1994a).
16 j = 2 is ruled out because it would be meaningless unless a threshold of 0 is imposed, and this would yield identical
results to the case of 2 voting groups; the latter are discussed in footnote 18. Note, however, that it is not necessary
to restrict j to a value smaller than or equal to n.
17 In the context of monetary-policy voting, an intuitive partitioning would be given by j = 3, with the partitions being
“contractionary – neutral – expansionary”; this will be the option chosen in subsection IV.2.
18 A second refinement, similar to that suggested by Kirman & Widgrén (1995), consists in postulating the existence of
m exogenously-predetermined voting group(s) of  k s  like-minded players (0 < m < n,  n s
m
k k £ ￿ =1 ), again based on
each voter’s expected stance on the specific issue to be resolved. In this set-up, all n voters need not belong to a
group, but those who do are assumed to show greater commitment to their fellow group members than under the
voters-partitioning assumption: whenever any player which belongs to group k enters (or leaves) a coalition, all
other  1 - k s  players belonging to group k enter (or leave) the coalition with her. Given that such rigid commitments
are unlikely to hold in the context of European monetary policy-making, the simulations based on this set of
assumptions are not discussed in section V, although their results are available from the author upon request. For
another application of such “bloc“ voting to decisions related to the Stability and Growth Pact, see Sutter (1999).Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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The application of this extension will be crucial in section V to quantify the effect, on each EMU
member’s voting power, of the scenarios discussed in subsection IV.2. Before that, however, it is
necessary to have a very accurate understanding of how decisions on monetary policy are supposed
to be taken by the ECB. The next section examines what EMU’s founding treaties have to say on
the ECB’s operational structure in the area of monetary policy-making.
III. STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE ECB
Given the focus of the paper, this section only examines those features of the ECB’s statutes which
determine the institutional framework for the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy under EMU
19.
The provisions of the Treaty and Protocol (European Commission, 1991a and 1991b) concerning
the ECB’s role in banking supervision and exchange-rate policy will not be detailed here, since they
are outside our direct concern
20.
When entering EMU, each EU member country delegates its monetary-policy responsibilities to the
ECB’s two decision-making bodies (Treaty Art. 106(3), 109a(1) and 109a(2)(a), reproduced as
Protocol Art. 9.3, 10.1, and 11.1), schematically represented in Figure 1:
• an Executive Board (EB), comprising the ECB’s President, its Vice-President and 4 other EB
members;
• a Governing Council (GC), consisting of all EB members plus the Governors of EMU member
countries’ Central Banks (National Central Bank, or NCB, Governors)
21.
                                               
19 What the ECB’s exact operational framework will be is still unclear, despite efforts by the ECB to clarify its
strategy (European Central Bank, 1998); see Bini Smaghi (1996), European Commission (1997a, 1997b) and
European Monetary Institute (1997), as well as the references therein, for detailed considerations on the topic.
20 For a discussion of these and other issues directly related to the ECB’s Statutes, see Giovannini (1992).
21 Two other bodies, with essentially advisory or consultation functions, are also created at the start of Stage 3 of EMU
(January 1
st, 1999): an Economic and Financial Committee (Treaty Art. 109c(2)), and a General Council (Treaty
Art. 109l(3); Protocol Art. 45-47); see also Goodhart (1993). These bodies will not, however, be involved in the
monetary-policy decisions of the ECB.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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Figure 1
Protocol Art. 12.1 formally defines the respective duties of these two concentric decision-making
bodies. It unambiguously attributes strategic responsibilities to the GC (it “shall adopt the
guidelines and make the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the
ESCB”), while the EB’s tasks are merely of an operational kind (it “shall implement monetary
policy in accordance with the guidelines and decisions laid down by the Governing Council”).
Since, still in the words of Protocol Art. 12.1, it falls on the GC to “formulate the monetary policy
of the Community”, it is this body’s composition and formal decision-making procedures which
will be the object of this paper’s scrutiny. In particular, its voting rules are determined by Protocol
Art.10.2: decisions are to be taken by simple majority on a one member – one vote basis, except
when the vote is tied, in which case the ECB’s President has a casting vote. In terms of voting
power, the ECB’s Vice-President will therefore have no particular advantage over other GC
members, while the President may, in certain circumstances, find himself in a very powerful
position
22; this may shed new light on the insistence of some EMU member countries at having one
of their nationals elected as ECB President
23.
                                               
22 This requires, of course, an even number of GC members, a situation which is likely to arise only when EMU
accepts new entrants (since there are 11 EMU founders, and thus 17 current GC members); see Mangano (1999) for
a discussion of the voting-power effect on current EMU members of the UK’s, Sweden’s, Greece’s and/or
Denmark’s entry into EMU.
23 This insistence could also be linked to Knott’s (1986) description of the Fed (and FOMC) Chairman as “the
gatekeeper and spokesman for the system, which gives him great advantage over other members” (p. 199) (although
it is not clear how, in practice, this advantage would materialise), or to Krause’s (1996) observation that “control of
the agenda enables the chair […] to influence decision making to a large extent” (p. 85). These contentions,
however, seem to be empirically contradicted by Chappell, Havrilesky & McGregor (1995), who find they “cannot
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Formally, given the simple-majority rule, each of the GC’s monetary policy decisions (on whether
to increase, decrease or leave unchanged the ECB Funds rate) can be described by a weighted
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where the first term in the square brackets is the quota (majority) needed for a decision to be taken,
and the  i w s are the weights (number of votes) of each player, in our case, of each country
represented in the GC (see next section for a discussion of what the value of those  i w s can be)
 25.
It is one thing, however, to say that each GC member has one vote in the regular deliberations on
monetary policy, but quite another to speculate on how that vote will be used in practice. Outside
observers may be entitled to ask, Will some GC members vote systematically with some others ?
Are those potential alliances likely to shift across time ?  Will EB members’ attitude in this respect
differ from that of all other GC members ?  This paper is not directly interested in the relative
likelihood of these (and related) conjectures; its main objective is instead to examine what can be
the effect of those various patterns of voting behaviour on each member-country’s (theoretical)
voting power. The next section introduces (and briefly justifies) what are considered as plausible
assumptions about GC members’ voting behaviour, and constructs a number of conceivable voting
scenarios. The distribution of voting power in those scenarios will be computed and compared in
the following section.
                                               
24 See W. Lucas (1983).
25 The expression for the quota in this weighted voting game is specific to the game being considered; more generally,




i i w q w 1 2 / ) ( 1 ; see e.g. part 2 of Felsenthal & Machover
(1995).Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
- 12 -
IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND SCENARIOS
In order to calculate what might be the theoretical power of each current EMU member over
common monetary-policy decisions, it is necessary, first, to define a few operating assumptions,
based on the ECB’s structural characteristics outlined in section III, and second, to characterise a
number of plausible voting patterns, based on EMU’s current membership and on those members’
expected preferences over monetary policy.
IV.1. ASSUMPTIONS
The computations of section V will contrast the voting-power consequences of two sets of basic
assumptions. First, EB members will be considered as an entirely separate entity, caring exclusively
about (GDP-weighted) EMU-wide averages, while all other GC members, regardless of their
previous anti-inflationary credentials, will be seen as defending their own country’s interests at the
ECB. EB members will be described as “non-partisan”, in the sense that their position will not
necessarily conform with the specific needs of their country of origin; their voting power will be
(collectively) attributed to a supranational entity, to be called “EMU-11”. By contrast, every NCB
Governor will be supposed to embody his nation’s preferences when voting on EMU-wide
monetary policy, and the voting power he exerts will be counted towards his country’s relative
influence. Under that set of assumptions, there will thus effectively be 12 players in the game, one
for each EMU member country (carrying a single vote), and one for EMU-11 (carrying 6 votes)
26.
In the second set of assumptions, all GC members, including EB members (who will then be
described as “partisan”), will be deemed to behave in the same way: they will all care exclusively
for their country of origin, and their vote will directly be attributed to that country. For voting-
power calculation purposes, this simply boils down to analysing a game of 11 players, with each
EMU member country having 2 votes when one of its representatives sits on the EB (1 through that
representative, 1 through its NCB Governor)
27, and 1 vote when it has no such representative
28.
                                               
26 This set of assumptions seems to conform with the view adopted by a number of outside commentators; see e.g.
Financial Times (1998b).
27 With an even number of EMU members, infinitesimally more than 2 votes would have to be given to the country
whose representative is the ECB President (in order to account for the ECB President’s casting vote in case of a tie).
However, this case may only arise with future EMU enlargements; see Mangano (1999).Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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There are a number of intuitive reasons to assume that the CB Governors of EMU member
countries will push for the monetary policy which most favours their region. First, an analogy with
the US Federal Reserve seems to support this intuition. Knott (1986) contends that “the presidents’
[NCB Governors’, in ECB’s case] preferences tend to reflect the regional, industrial and
commercial interests in their constituencies” (p. 205); he is echoed by Gildea (1992), who produces
convincing evidence that “presidents […] are seemingly influenced by […] their primary
constituency” (p. 224). Krause (1996) relies on past research to suggest that “Board of Governors
and Regional Bank Presidents […] are fundamentally different since they serve different contractual
principals” (p. 90), a statement which is documented by Chappell, Havrilesky & McGregor (1995).
Earlier studies of the ECB seem to concur. Dornbusch, Favero & Giavazzi (1998) find it “plausible
to assume that [the] bank presidents would respond to local conditions either in a direct partisan
way or else because local conditions, beyond  the numbers, shape their perception” (pp. 26-27). De
Grauwe, Dewachter & Aksoy (1998) assume throughout their simulations that “the presidents of
[national] central banks […] use the national values of output and inflation to determine their
position on the interest rate” (p. 18). Von Hagen (1998), comparing their appointment procedure
with that of EB members, contends that “NCB [National Central Bank] Presidents will feel strong
ties to their home countries and a need to bring their national monetary policy interests to bear in
council meetings” (p. 3-4). Von Hagen & Süppel (1994) build their model of monetary policy-
making in a monetary union around the presumption that “country representatives [in the Council]
consider inflation and employment in their home countries as relevant targets” (p. 777). Alesina &
Grilli (1991) seem to agree that national CB Governors will faithfully represent their home country
at the ECB when they write that “the ECB policy will be decided by a Council that is composed
[among others] by the national central bank governors. Therefore, each country has the opportunity
to participate and affect the policy choice through its central bank governor” (p. 22, emphasis
added)
29.
                                                                                                                                                           
28 Such a procedure is implicitly supported by De Grauwe, Dewachter & Aksoy (1998), according to whom the fact
that “in the ECB there will be […] a President, a Vice-President and four Directors who will also cast their vote […]
implies that some countries will have more than one vote in the [Governing] Council” (p. 3). Brueckner (1997) also
recognises the validity of the procedure by stating that “it might be assumed that the members of the [Executive]
Board have the same utility function as the [Central Bank] governor of their country of origin. This implies that
countries with members in the Board have accordingly more voting weights” (p. 6).
29 Note, however, the different opinion of Bini Smaghi (1996), according to whom the fact that “each member of the
ECB Governing Council has the same vote […] creates a strong presumption for the members of the governing
bodies to take their decisions in the interest of the whole Union” (p. 15). Bruni (1996) also contends that “the statuteGabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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The national-bias assumption may seem less realistic in the case of EB members, and in particular
of the ECB President
30. However, in view of the political intrigue that surrounded the appointment
of the first such President
31, and given the considerable amount of national prestige involved in the
appointment of the remaining EB members, the governments of EMU members are likely not to
refrain from seeking to press their national representative in the EB (if they have one), despite the
fact that they are formally forbidden to do so by the ECB’s Statutes (Treaty Art. 107, reproduced as
Protocol Art. 7)
32. Furthermore, one can reasonably expect EB members themselves to be
particularly sensitive to their home country’s economic prospects, whatever their claims to
impartiality and euro-mindedness. This point of view is shared by Vaubel (1999), in whose
simulations “each member of the Executive Board is assumed to share and represent the inflation
preferences of the government which has appointed her” (p. 4), and by Dornbusch, Favero &
Giavazzi (1998), according to whom “when an issue of difference arises, a French appointee would
vote in the style of France, and a German, as predictably, in the way of the Bundesbank” (p. 26).
Bindseil & Hantke (1997), in their discussion of power in all of the EU's decision-making
institutions, also assume that “all individual members of the different EU organs always vote in the
national interest of their home country”, and stress that “even if this were not always the case […],
this would not systematically change the power distribution, if such ‘disloyalty’ occurred equally
among all member states and was not too frequent” (pp. 173-174). Practically, therefore, assuming a
domestic bias for all GC members, as is done in the second set of assumptions, should not be too far
                                                                                                                                                           
of the ECB has been organised in such a way as to favour the making of decisions in the ‘supernational interest’ ”,
and that “the role of the Governors of the NCBs should not be to represent their national interests and form
coalitions to this end” (p. 22).
30 This presumption seems to be turned on its head by Chappell, McGregor & Vermilyea (1997) who, in their
introduction to a study of the FOMC during the 1970-1978 period, contend that “Bank presidents are not direct
political appointees and may therefore be less responsive to political pressures than Governors [EB members, in
ECB’s case]” (p. 4).
31 Pour mémoire, France pushed for one of its nationals to get the ECB President job instead of everyone else’s Dutch
favourite, and finally got a loose commitment from the latter to retire in favour of the former approximately half-
way through his 8-year legal term; see, for instance, Financial Times (1998a).
32 Whether the lack of transparency in the GC's decision-making process (notably, its refusal to publish the minutes of
its fortnightly meetings) is likely to reinforce or weaken the incentive for national governments to do so is still
disputed; see Svensson (1998) for a convincing argument in favour of transparency, as well as the contrasting
opinions of O. Issing (EB member at the ECB) and W. Buiter (member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy
Committee) in Financial Times (1988c).Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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of the mark; but it will be interesting to contrast in section V the voting-power outcomes of the two
competing sets of hypotheses.
IV.2. SCENARIOS
As of January 1
st, 1999, the 11 NCB Governors at the ECB have had to agree, together with the 6
EB members (whether or not the latter are seen as additional country representatives), on a single
monetary policy for the whole EMU area. As time goes by, occasional (even regular) disagreements
between them are almost certain to surface, most likely for two types of reasons: either macro-
economic developments in some of the member countries will conflict with those of others
33; or
purely geo-political motives will induce some member countries to side with—or against—some
others.
This subsection suggests two plausible voting scenarios where, unlike in the “baseline” case,  each
member state’s voting power is not simply based on its number of votes in the GC; instead, in these
scenarios, the identity of those fellow voters with whom it is, a priori, expected to collude also
matters. Such partitioning of voters in the GC is assumed to be influenced by one of the two
motives discussed above.
Consequently, the first scenario, the “Macro” (or “M”) scenario, draws on available forecasts
34 of
the variables which are most likely to affect the preferences of each member country on monetary
policy, namely “price” indicators (i.e. forecasted variations in implicit GDP & private-consumption
deflators)
35. Schematically:
Scenario M: NL + FI + SP + IR _______IT + PL_______ D + F + BE + LX + Ö (+ EMU-11)
                                               
33 Brueckner’s (1997) comparison of different voting mechanisms inside the ECB’s GC is based on the same
assumption; for a formal treatment of the possible mechanism sustaining it, see, among others, Giovannetti &
Marimon (1998).
34 Extracted from OECD (1998).
35 Computations resulting from scenarios based on other macro-economic variables, namely “production” indicators
(forecasted variations in real-GDP growth rates, relative output gaps and unemployment rates) and “fiscal”
indicators (forecasted variations in government debts and budget deficits) are not included in the text, but are
available from the author upon request.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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The second scenario, the “Geo-Political” (or “G”) scenario, divides member countries more or less
according to their geographical or ideological distribution, implicitly relying on the intuition that
“neighbours”, both for strategic (fear of retaliation) and historical (similar industrial structure)
reasons, are likely to vote with each-other, sometimes even regardless of their own specific needs.
Schematically:
Scenario G: NL + D + BE + LX + Ö _______ FI + IR (+ EMU-11)_______F + IT + SP + PL
In these two scenarios, the eleven EMU member countries (plus EMU-11, when applicable) are
distributed along 3 partitions according to their (assumed) preferred monetary-policy stance: rather
contractionary for countries on the left-hand-side (Partition No 1), rather neutral for countries in the
middle (Partition No 2), and rather expansionary for countries on the right-hand-side (Partition No
3). In this context, the threshold for “policy distance” (see subsection II.4) can be logically set to 1,
implying that all voters in partition No 1 will refuse to share a coalition with any voter in partition
No 3 (and vice-versa), while voters in partition No 2 will agree to enter any coalition, and will be
accepted by all other players in any coalition.
The purpose of the partitions postulated in these two scenarios is to illustrate the potential voting-
power consequences of the a priori formation of coalitions inside the GC. Although they were
constructed to reflect as realistically as possible the conflicts which could arise in the foreseeable
future between EMU members
36, these partitions should not be considered as the only possible
alternatives, but rather as constituting reasonably credible working assumptions
37. In order to better
illustrate the potential impact, on each member’s voting power, of some members’ tendency to
switch preferences, and to take into account the flexible nature of these preferences, 3 more “sub-
scenarios” will be examined, each based on scenario M, but with one country “shifting” from its
original partition to another:
Scenario M+S1: D becomes contractionary (leaves Partition 3 to join Partition 1);
                                               
36 The “Macro” partitioning, in particular, was realistic at the time of writing the first draft of this paper, and may not
necessarily be so at the time of reading this draft.
37 As Sutter (1999) puts it in a similar context, “for a true assessment of actual (a posteriori) voting power one would
need reliable, mostly empirical, data on actual voting behaviour, the cohesiveness of coalitions or their probabilities
of being formed” (p. 11), which is obviously not available at this early stage of EMU’s existence.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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Scenario M+S2: NL becomes expansionary (leaves Partition 1 to join Partition 3);
Scenario M+S3: PL becomes expansionary (leaves Partition 2 to join Partition 3).
In the next section, 18 voting-power distributions are therefore computed, one for each of the 3
indices (SSI, SBI and HPI) in each of the 6 selected (sub-)scenarios (including the “baseline” case,
where no a priori partitioning of voters is postulated); furthermore, this process is repeated for the 2
sets of assumptions on EB-members’ voting behaviour discussed in subsection IV.1. Appendix 1
offers a schematic structure of these 36 simulations.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Table 1 presents all 36 voting-power distributions, while Appendix 2 illustrates these distributions.
A few general things can be said from the outset about these results.
First, while the first 2 computed indices, SSI and SBI, generally yield fairly similar distributions
across all scenarios, HPI often produces a markedly different distribution from the two others. If we
accept that the latter gauges “policy impact” more accurately (see subsection II.3), there seems to be
quite frequently a difference, in this particular monetary-policy game, between a member’s relative
contribution to a decision which conforms to his or her preferences (something the SSI and SBI
tend to capture), and such a member’s actual impact on that policy decision (which is better
measured by the HPI). Throughout this section and the next, therefore, a distinction will regularly
be drawn between each voter’s voting power (when referring to the SSI and SBI) and policy impact
(when referring to the HPI).
Second, at the risk of stating the obvious, it may be worth stressing that, contrary to what some
informal discussions of European monetary policy-making seem to assume
38, it definitely does not
matter for an EMU member’s a priori voting power whether it is “small” or “big” (e.g. in terms of
relative real GDP); Table 1 clearly shows that this holds under any set of assumptions, even when
no voter partitioning is postulated. All that matters is whether EB members adopt a non-partisan or
partisan perspective, and in the latter case, whether a country has 1 or 2 of its nationals at the GC.
                                               
38 See among other Financial Times (1998e), and my reply in Financial Times (1998f).Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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NL D F FI IT SP IR BE LX Ö PL EMU-11 SUM
SSI 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 4.55% 50.00% 100%
SBI 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 3.10% 65.91% 100%
HPI 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 14.29% 100%
SSI 0.00% 8.93% 8.93% 0.00% 8.93% 0.00% 0.00% 8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 37.50% 100%
SBI 0.00% 7.35% 7.35% 0.00% 7.35% 0.00% 0.00% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 48.53% 100%
HPI 0.00% 10.71% 10.71% 0.00% 10.71% 0.00% 0.00% 10.71% 10.71% 10.71% 10.71% 25.00% 100%
SSI 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 11.11% 33.33% 100%
SBI 0.00% 0.00% 9.80% 0.00% 9.80% 0.00% 0.00% 9.80% 9.80% 9.80% 9.80% 41.18% 100%
HPI 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 12.50% 0.00% 0.00% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 100%
SSI 7.14% 7.14% 7.14% 0.00% 7.14% 0.00% 0.00% 7.14% 7.14% 7.14% 7.14% 42.86% 100%
SBI 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 0.00% 5.43% 0.00% 0.00% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 5.43% 56.59% 100%
HPI 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 0.00% 9.38% 0.00% 0.00% 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 25.00% 100%
SSI 0.00% 8.93% 8.93% 0.00% 8.93% 0.00% 0.00% 8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 37.50% 100%
SBI 0.00% 7.35% 7.35% 0.00% 7.35% 0.00% 0.00% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 7.35% 48.53% 100%
HPI 0.00% 10.71% 10.71% 0.00% 10.71% 0.00% 0.00% 10.71% 10.71% 10.71% 10.71% 25.00% 100%
SSI 5.81% 5.81% 3.88% 9.69% 3.88% 3.88% 9.69% 5.81% 5.81% 5.81% 3.88% 36.05% 100%
SBI 4.90% 4.90% 3.27% 8.17% 3.27% 3.27% 8.17% 4.90% 4.90% 4.90% 3.27% 46.08% 100%
HPI 6.82% 6.82% 4.55% 11.36% 4.55% 4.55% 11.36% 6.82% 6.82% 6.82% 4.55% 25.00% 100%
NL D F FI IT SP IR BE LX Ö PL SUM
SSI 11.98% 11.98% 11.98% 11.98% 11.98% 11.98% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 5.63% 100%
SBI 11.88% 11.88% 11.88% 11.88% 11.88% 11.88% 5.75% 5.75% 5.75% 5.75% 5.75% 100%
HPI 9.36% 9.36% 9.36% 9.36% 9.36% 9.36% 8.77% 8.77% 8.77% 8.77% 8.77% 100%
SSI 7.80% 11.93% 11.93% 7.80% 19.72% 7.80% 2.75% 6.88% 6.88% 6.88% 9.63% 100%
SBI 7.32% 12.20% 12.20% 7.32% 19.51% 7.32% 2.44% 7.32% 7.32% 7.32% 9.76% 100%
HPI 5.88% 11.76% 11.76% 5.88% 17.65% 5.88% 2.94% 8.82% 8.82% 8.82% 11.76% 100%
SSI 17.21% 17.21% 0.00% 17.21% 17.21% 17.21% 6.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.98% 100%
SBI 17.33% 17.33% 0.00% 17.33% 17.33% 17.33% 6.67% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.67% 100%
HPI 16.36% 16.36% 0.00% 16.36% 16.36% 16.36% 9.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.09% 100%
SSI 16.67% 16.67% 16.67% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 0.00% 8.33% 8.33% 8.33% 8.33% 100%
SBI 16.45% 16.45% 16.45% 0.00% 16.45% 0.00% 0.00% 8.55% 8.55% 8.55% 8.55% 100%
HPI 13.79% 13.79% 13.79% 0.00% 13.79% 0.00% 0.00% 11.21% 11.21% 11.21% 11.21% 100%
SSI 3.57% 15.48% 15.48% 3.57% 19.05% 3.57% 3.57% 8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 8.93% 100%
SBI 3.13% 15.63% 15.63% 3.13% 18.74% 3.13% 3.13% 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 9.38% 100%
HPI 3.45% 13.79% 13.79% 3.45% 17.24% 3.45% 3.45% 10.34% 10.34% 10.34% 10.34% 100%
SSI 11.93% 11.93% 7.80% 19.72% 7.80% 7.80% 9.63% 6.88% 6.88% 6.88% 2.75% 100%
SBI 12.20% 12.20% 7.32% 19.51% 7.32% 7.32% 9.76% 7.32% 7.32% 7.32% 2.44% 100%
HPI 11.76% 11.76% 5.88% 17.65% 5.88% 5.88% 11.76% 8.82% 8.82% 8.82% 2.94% 100%
Table 1:





Sc. M + S1
Sc. M + S2
Sc. M + S3
B. Partisan EB Members
Sc. M + S2
Sc. M + S3
A. Non-Partisan EB Members
Baseline
Sc. M
Sc. M + S1
Third, even the case where voter-partitioning is excluded from the computations (the “baseline”
case) has some interesting implications. When EB members are considered partisan, the baseline
voting power (or policy impact) measured by a given index is obviously identical within each group
of countries (those with and those without an EB representative), while it is identical across allGabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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countries when EB members are considered non-partisan
39. But the magnitude of the 4 relationships
illustrated in Figure 2 deserves some comments:
Figure 2
1. The 6-member EB can claim between 50% and 66% voting power, while the equivalent for each
country individually is only 3.1% – 4.6%. Therefore, when no a priori partitioning of voters is
postulated, the EB, although neither a “dictator” nor a holder of “veto power” (see footnote 5),
enjoys significantly more voting power than its number of votes would imply (6 out of 17, i.e.
35.3%), while each member country finds itself with only half to three-quarters as much voting
power as its individual number of votes would imply (1 out of 17, i.e. 5.9%)
40. This may reassure
some people who are inclined to believe in this set of assumptions (i.e. a non-partisan EB
defending EMU-wide interests against nationally-minded NCB Governors), and who may fear
that national interests are over-represented with 11 votes out of 17 
41.
2. The 6-member EB enjoys only 14.3% policy impact, while each country claims as much as
7.8%. Therefore, when no coalition formation can be a priori expected, the 6-member EB enjoys
significantly less policy impact than its number of votes would imply, in sharp contrast with the
                                               
39 This is simply a consequence of the “symmetry” property of the basic versions of the three indices examined, i.e.
{ } HPI SBI SSI I N j i j i I I w w j i j i , , , , and for ˛ " ˛ „ = ￿ = .
40 Even when a priori voter partitioning is allowed, a non-partisan EB can still claim, depending on the scenario, to be
crucial in about 33% – 57% of all decisions, and only once (SSI, scenario M + S1) does it have less voting power
than its voting share would imply.
41 Von Hagen (1998) wonders: “How powerful will the ECB [Executive] Board be relative to the NCB Presidents on
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conclusions reached when examining voting power
42. Even more strikingly, while in such
conditions it takes all 11 NCB Governors to match the EB’s voting power, merely 2 such NCB
Governors put together have more policy impact than the whole EB (although the dynamics of
coalition formation are discussed in further detail below).
3. The ratio between the voting power of those EMU members with an EB representative (11.9% –
12%) and that of those without one (5.6% – 5.8%) is relatively close to their relative number of
votes in the GC. In this baseline case, therefore, having an EB representative does not seem to
have a disproportionate effect on a country’s voting power; voting shares are in these
circumstances a fairly good indicator of voting power.
4. Even EMU members with no representative at the EB can have a non-negligible impact on
common monetary-policy decisions, since on average, they are estimated to be “crucial” in 8.8%
of all policy decisions, while that figure for other EMU members is only slightly higher at 9.4%.
In these circumstances, each country’s respective voting share in the GC is thus a poor indicator
of its policy impact, again in contrast with the conclusions reached when examining voting
power.
Fourth, even at this early stage, one can draw interesting conclusions by identifying the country (or
countries) which has the largest voting power (or policy impact) in each scenario, and trying to
determine whether a marked predominance of some countries with respect to others appears across
all scenarios. In this respect, the following 3 observations are worth mentioning:
• With non-partisan EB members, whichever country finds itself in the opposite partition from that
which contains EMU-11 ends up with no voting power (or policy impact) at all: this indicates
that when EMU-11 represents average EMU preferences, those countries whose preferences are
incompatible with that average end up with no influence on common monetary-policy decisions.
• In each “Macro” scenario (including the shifts discussed below and introduced in subsection
IV.2), Italy is always at least among those countries with the highest voting power (and policy
impact); with partisan EB members, in scenarios M and M + S3, it is even the only one with a
voting power of close to 20% (policy impact: close to 18%). This is obviously due to the fact
that, given its “neutral” a priori monetary-policy stance in those scenarios, it is acceptable as a
coalition partner to countries of both other partitions, and with partisan EB members, it has more
power than its fellow “neutral” (Portugal) because it has 1 more vote (thanks to its EB
representative).
                                               
42 Curiously, the EB’s share of policy impact is constant across all postulated scenarios, at 25%.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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• In the “Geo-Political” scenario, whatever the behaviour of EB members, it is always Finland
who claims the highest voting power (and policy impact): with non-partisan EB members, jointly
with Ireland at close to 10% each (policy impact: more than 11%), and with partisan EB
members, on its own at close to 20% (policy impact: close to 18%). This is also explained by
both countries’ “neutral” a priori monetary-policy stance, and their respective number of votes
when EB members are partisan.
The remainder of this section discusses the consequences of coalition formation in more detail. It is
organised around the three aspects of the monetary-policy voting game on which this paper seeks to
get a better perspective, namely:
• what is the effect, on each EMU member-country’s voting power, of the two competing sets of
assumptions on the voting behaviour of EB members ?
• how sensitive is each EMU member-country’s voting power to variations in some of these
members’ preferences over the course of European monetary policy ?
• how can we describe each EMU member-country’s preferences across all postulated patterns of
coalition formation (scenarios), and in particular, what is their “most-” and “least-preferred”
option ? 
43
V.1. PARTISAN VS NON-PARTISAN EB MEMBERS
This subsection focuses on the effect, on each EMU-member’s voting power, of the two
assumptions outlined in subsection IV.1. More specifically, it aims to explore the sign and
magnitude of the change in power experienced by each EMU member country when all EB
members switch from an EMU-wide perspective to an individual-country focus
44.
                                               
43 As indicated in footnote 1, an analysis of the effect on each member’s voting power of future EMU enlargement(s)
(i.e. how much influence they stand to gain or lose by widening the group of initial participants, which candidates
are most likely to be favoured by incumbent members on voting-power grounds, the extent to which enlargement
can encourage some current members to enter or switch alliances, etc.) is provided by a companion paper, Mangano
(1999).
44 For simplicity, EB members are assumed to reach a collective behavioural decision: either they all are EMU-
minded, or they all vote according to the evolution of variables in their country of origin. An interesting extension
would be to examine the consequences of such focus-switching by only some EB members.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
- 22 -
The results of this scenario-by-scenario, country-by-country comparison are given in Tables 2 and
3. They clearly indicate that, when a priori voter partitioning is factored in, the distribution of
voting power between countries with and without EB representatives can change dramatically.
When each EB member is assumed to vote according to his or her nationality rather than for EMU-
wide averages, the six EMU member countries with one of their nationals at the EB can count on 2
votes at the GC; it appears from Table 2 that this, however, is not a guarantee of proportionately
larger voting power (or policy impact), and some of those countries (France, Finland or Spain) can
in certain cases find themselves with no voting power at all.
Although in that group of countries, positive voting-power (or policy-impact) variations greatly
outnumber negative (or nil) ones (99 against 9), these gains are not systematically significant. On
the one hand, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Spain can see their voting power boosted
from 0% to 17% (policy impact: 0% to 16%) in scenario M + S1; Italy, in scenario M, can even
enjoy a voting power of close to 20% (SSI). But on the other hand, having an additional vote can
sometimes have no effect at all on those countries’ voting power (France, scenario M + S1, Finland
and Spain, scenario M + S2), or it can add anything between 1.6 percentage points (all 6 countries,
HPI, baseline scenario) and 12 percentage points (Italy, SBI, scenario M). Perhaps more
surprisingly, the only voting-power loss in that group (France, scenario M + S1) wipes off all of that
country’s voting power (and policy impact), depriving it of 10 to 12 percentage points.
When comparing the top half of each page in Appendix 3, it even seems that the aggregate policy
impact of the 6 EMU countries with an EB representative is not as much expanded by EB members’
partisanship as their collective voting power (although as a group, those countries always see an
improvement in their voting power or policy impact). It is therefore not clear that all EMU member
countries with one of their nationals at the EB always have a clear interest in seeing those EB
members vote along national rather than EMU-wide lines.
In a symmetric way, Table 3 shows that even countries with no EB representative do not necessarily
lose some of their influence when the other 6 countries get one more vote (i.e. when EB members
become partisan); on the contrary, positive voting-power (or policy-impact) variations outnumber
negative (or nil) ones in that group of countries (54 against 36)
45. Ireland’s voting power, in
particular, is adversely affected in only one case (scenario G, SSI), and very slightly so (a voting-
power loss of a mere 0.06 percentage points); in all other case, it either gains from (up to 9 policy-
                                               
45 No particular difference appears in this respect when policy impact is considered separately from voting power: the
ratio of positive to negative (or nil) voting-power variations is 16 to 14 for SSI and 21 to 9 for SBI, while the ratio of
positive to negative (or nil) policy-impact variations is 17 to 13.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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impact percentage points), or is indifferent to, EB members’ partisanship. On the other hand,
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria face in scenario M + S1 the steepest potential decline in their
voting power and policy impact, with a loss of 11 and 12.5 percentage points, respectively, i.e. a



















Baseline 4.55% 11.98% 7.43 3.10% 11.88% 8.78 7.79% 9.36% 1.57
Sc. M 0.00% 7.80% 7.80 0.00% 7.32% 7.32 0.00% 5.88% 5.88
Sc. M+S1 0.00% 17.21% 17.21 0.00% 17.33% 17.33 0.00% 16.36% 16.36
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 16.67% 9.53 5.43% 16.45% 11.02 9.38% 13.79% 4.41
Sc. M+S3 0.00% 3.57% 3.57 0.00% 3.13% 3.13 0.00% 3.45% 3.45
Sc. G 5.81% 11.93% 6.12 4.90% 12.20% 7.30 6.82% 11.76% 4.94
Baseline 4.55% 11.98% 7.43 3.10% 11.88% 8.78 7.79% 9.36% 1.57
Sc. M 8.93% 11.93% 3.00 7.35% 12.20% 4.85 10.71% 11.76% 1.05
Sc. M+S1 0.00% 17.21% 17.21 0.00% 17.33% 17.33 0.00% 16.36% 16.36
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 16.67% 9.53 5.43% 16.45% 11.02 9.38% 13.79% 4.41
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 15.48% 6.55 7.35% 15.63% 8.28 10.71% 13.79% 3.08
Sc. G 5.81% 11.93% 6.12 4.90% 12.20% 7.30 6.82% 11.76% 4.94
Baseline 4.55% 11.98% 7.43 3.10% 11.88% 8.78 7.79% 9.36% 1.57
Sc. M 8.93% 11.93% 3.00 7.35% 12.20% 4.85 10.71% 11.76% 1.05
Sc. M+S1 11.11% 0.00% -11.11 9.80% 0.00% -9.80 12.50% 0.00% -12.50
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 16.67% 9.53 5.43% 16.45% 11.02 9.38% 13.79% 4.41
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 15.48% 6.55 7.35% 15.63% 8.28 10.71% 13.79% 3.08
Sc. G 3.88% 7.80% 3.92 3.27% 7.32% 4.05 4.55% 5.88% 1.33
Baseline 4.55% 11.98% 7.43 3.10% 11.88% 8.78 7.79% 9.36% 1.57
Sc. M 0.00% 7.80% 7.80 0.00% 7.32% 7.32 0.00% 5.88% 5.88
Sc. M+S1 0.00% 17.21% 17.21 0.00% 17.33% 17.33 0.00% 16.36% 16.36
Sc. M+S2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00
Sc. M+S3 0.00% 3.57% 3.57 0.00% 3.13% 3.13 0.00% 3.45% 3.45
Sc. G 9.69% 19.72% 10.03 8.17% 19.51% 11.34 11.36% 17.65% 6.29
Baseline 4.55% 11.98% 7.43 3.10% 11.88% 8.78 7.79% 9.36% 1.57
Sc. M 8.93% 19.72% 10.79 7.35% 19.51% 12.16 10.71% 17.65% 6.94
Sc. M+S1 11.11% 17.21% 6.10 9.80% 17.33% 7.53 12.50% 16.36% 3.86
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 16.67% 9.53 5.43% 16.45% 11.02 9.38% 13.79% 4.41
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 19.05% 10.12 7.35% 18.74% 11.39 10.71% 17.24% 6.53
Sc. G 3.88% 7.80% 3.92 3.27% 7.32% 4.05 4.55% 5.88% 1.33
Baseline 4.55% 11.98% 7.43 3.10% 11.88% 8.78 7.79% 9.36% 1.57
Sc. M 0.00% 7.80% 7.80 0.00% 7.32% 7.32 0.00% 5.88% 5.88
Sc. M+S1 0.00% 17.21% 17.21 0.00% 17.33% 17.33 0.00% 16.36% 16.36
Sc. M+S2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00
Sc. M+S3 0.00% 3.57% 3.57 0.00% 3.13% 3.13 0.00% 3.45% 3.45
Sc. G 3.88% 7.80% 3.92 3.27% 7.32% 4.05 4.55% 5.88% 1.33
Measured by SSI Measured by SBI Measured by HPI
Table 2:
On Voting Power of Countries with EB Representative







Even when considering the aggregate voting power (or policy impact) of the 5 EMU countries with
no EB representative, similar observations can be made. The bottom half of each page in Appendix
3 shows that in 13 charts out of 18 (3 indices for 6 scenarios), those countries are actually better off,
on the whole, when EB members are partisan than when they are not. Again, the simulations do not
support the intuition that EMU member countries with no EB representative are necessarily worse
off (from a voting-power perspective) when EB members focus on their own country’sGabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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developments rather than on EMU-wide aggregates. It appears that this intuition does not take into
account the potential coalition-formation tendency of GC members, and the voting-power



















Baseline 4.55% 5.63% 1.08 3.10% 5.75% 2.65 7.79% 8.77% 0.98
Sc. M 0.00% 2.75% 2.75 0.00% 2.44% 2.44 0.00% 2.94% 2.94
Sc. M+S1 0.00% 6.98% 6.98 0.00% 6.67% 6.67 0.00% 9.09% 9.09
Sc. M+S2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00
Sc. M+S3 0.00% 3.57% 3.57 0.00% 3.13% 3.13 0.00% 3.45% 3.45
Sc. G 9.69% 9.63% -0.06 8.17% 9.76% 1.59 11.36% 11.76% 0.40
Baseline 4.55% 5.63% 1.08 3.10% 5.75% 2.65 7.79% 8.77% 0.98
Sc. M 8.93% 6.88% -2.05 7.35% 7.32% -0.03 10.71% 8.82% -1.89
Sc. M+S1 11.11% 0.00% -11.11 9.80% 0.00% -9.80 12.50% 0.00% -12.50
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 8.33% 1.19 5.43% 8.55% 3.12 9.38% 11.21% 1.83
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 7.35% 9.38% 2.03 10.71% 10.34% -0.37
Sc. G 5.81% 6.88% 1.07 4.90% 7.32% 2.42 6.82% 8.82% 2.00
Baseline 4.55% 5.63% 1.08 3.10% 5.75% 2.65 7.79% 8.77% 0.98
Sc. M 8.93% 6.88% -2.05 7.35% 7.32% -0.03 10.71% 8.82% -1.89
Sc. M+S1 11.11% 0.00% -11.11 9.80% 0.00% -9.80 12.50% 0.00% -12.50
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 8.33% 1.19 5.43% 8.55% 3.12 9.38% 11.21% 1.83
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 7.35% 9.38% 2.03 10.71% 10.34% -0.37
Sc. G 5.81% 6.88% 1.07 4.90% 7.32% 2.42 6.82% 8.82% 2.00
Baseline 4.55% 5.63% 1.08 3.10% 5.75% 2.65 7.79% 8.77% 0.98
Sc. M 8.93% 6.88% -2.05 7.35% 7.32% -0.03 10.71% 8.82% -1.89
Sc. M+S1 11.11% 0.00% -11.11 9.80% 0.00% -9.80 12.50% 0.00% -12.50
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 8.33% 1.19 5.43% 8.55% 3.12 9.38% 11.21% 1.83
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 7.35% 9.38% 2.03 10.71% 10.34% -0.37
Sc. G 5.81% 6.88% 1.07 4.90% 7.32% 2.42 6.82% 8.82% 2.00
Baseline 4.55% 5.63% 1.08 3.10% 5.75% 2.65 7.79% 8.77% 0.98
Sc. M 8.93% 9.63% 0.70 7.35% 9.76% 2.41 10.71% 11.76% 1.05
Sc. M+S1 11.11% 6.98% -4.13 9.80% 6.67% -3.13 12.50% 9.09% -3.41
Sc. M+S2 7.14% 8.33% 1.19 5.43% 8.55% 3.12 9.38% 11.21% 1.83
Sc. M+S3 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 7.35% 9.38% 2.03 10.71% 10.34% -0.37






Measured by SSI Measured by SBI Measured by HPI
Table 3:
On Voting Power of Countries with No EB Representative
Effect of EB Members' Partisanship
V.2. ALLEGIANCE-SWITCHING
This subsection temporarily abstracts from the “baseline” (no voter-partitioning) and “Geo-
Political” scenarios, to focus instead on the “Macro” scenario and its 3 sub-scenarios described in
subsection IV.2. It illustrates and quantifies the potential impact, on each EMU member’s voting
power, of some countries’ tendency to switch allegiances, “shifting” from their original partition
(i.e. a priori monetary-policy stance) to another.
Each of the 3 shifts is examined individually in Tables 4 to 6, while Appendix 4 illustrates the
evolution of each member country’s voting power (and policy impact) across all shifts. In the
quantification of the results of these shifts, a distinction is made between the 4 types of votersGabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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affected: the shifting country itself, those in the partition that the shifting country leaves, those in
the partition that the shifting country joins, and those in the partition whose membership doesn’t
change.
Table 4 indicates that, within the limits of this paper’s assumptions and ceteris paribus, it is in
Germany’s interest to adopt a contractionary stance (rather than an expansionary one) only when it
can claim 2 votes in the GC, i.e. when EB members are partisan: it then increases its voting power
(or policy impact) by about 40%, to more than 17% (policy impact: 16.4%). The countries it joins
also benefit from this shift: on average, they more than double their voting power, and even treble
their policy impact. On the other hand, the countries which stay in the partition Germany leaves
suffer dramatically, since they all lose the whole of their voting power and policy impact; even
those countries which are in neither of the 2 partitions directly affected by the shift end up worse
off, losing between 10% and 30% of their voting power or policy impact.
When EB members are not partisan, instead, Germany stands to lose all its voting power if it
chooses to switch from partition 3 to partition 1: this is simply due to the fact that in this case, it
leaves a partition which represents average EMU preferences (in which the 6 votes of EMU-11
have a significant weight) to join another which does not. In this case, the countries in the partition
joined by Germany are indifferent to its shift (they still can claim no power at all), while all other
voters (except EMU-11) benefit from it (increasing their voting power by up to a third).
For the Netherlands instead, the behaviour of EB members is irrelevant, as far as the sign of the
effect on its own power of adopting (ceteris paribus) an expansionary monetary-policy stance is
concerned: Table 5 shows that with partisan EB members, the Netherlands’s voting power more
than doubles as a results of its shift, while it goes from nil to 5 – 7% (policy impact: 9.4%) with
non-partisan EB members (the latter effect being, symmetrically to the case discussed above, a
consequence of joining a partition which represents average EMU preferences, whose members
thus include the 6 votes-strong EMU-11). However, the voters it joins only gain from its shift when
EB members are nationally-minded: they then increase their voting power by 20% – 40% (policy
impact: +17% – +27%), while their voting power drops by 20% – 26% (policy impact: -12%) when
EB members are not partisan (except EMU-11). The effect of this shift on the countries whose
partition the Netherlands leaves also depends on the behaviour of EB members: those countries are
indifferent when EB members are non-partisan (wielding no power at all before and after the shift),
but they lose all of their power when EB members are partisan. For their part, the 2 countries who
form the partition not affected by the shift end up with less voting power and policy impact,




















D 8.93% 0.00% -8.93 -100% 11.93% 17.21% 5.28 44%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 17.21% 9.41 121%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 17.21% 9.41 121%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 17.21% 9.41 121%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.75% 6.98% 4.23 154%
F 8.93% 11.11% 2.18 24% 11.93% 0.00% -11.93 -100%
BE 8.93% 11.11% 2.18 24% 6.88% 0.00% -6.88 -100%
LX 8.93% 11.11% 2.18 24% 6.88% 0.00% -6.88 -100%
Ö 8.93% 11.11% 2.18 24% 6.88% 0.00% -6.88 -100%
EMU-11 37.50% 33.33% -4.17 -11% -- -- -- --
IT 8.93% 11.11% 2.18 24% 19.72% 17.21% -2.51 -13%



















D 7.35% 0.00% -7.35 -100% 12.20% 17.33% 5.13 42%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 17.33% 10.01 137%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 17.33% 10.01 137%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 17.33% 10.01 137%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.44% 6.67% 4.23 173%
F 7.35% 9.80% 2.45 33% 12.20% 0.00% -12.20 -100%
BE 7.35% 9.80% 2.45 33% 7.32% 0.00% -7.32 -100%
LX 7.35% 9.80% 2.45 33% 7.32% 0.00% -7.32 -100%
Ö 7.35% 9.80% 2.45 33% 7.32% 0.00% -7.32 -100%
EMU-11 48.53% 41.18% -7.35 -15% -- -- -- --
IT 7.35% 9.80% 2.45 33% 19.51% 17.33% -2.18 -11%



















D 10.71% 0.00% -10.71 -100% 11.76% 16.36% 4.60 39%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 16.36% 10.48 178%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 16.36% 10.48 178%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 16.36% 10.48 178%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.94% 9.09% 6.15 209%
F 10.71% 12.50% 1.79 17% 11.76% 0.00% -11.76 -100%
BE 10.71% 12.50% 1.79 17% 8.82% 0.00% -8.82 -100%
LX 10.71% 12.50% 1.79 17% 8.82% 0.00% -8.82 -100%
Ö 10.71% 12.50% 1.79 17% 8.82% 0.00% -8.82 -100%
EMU-11 25.00% 25.00% 0.00 0% -- -- -- --
IT 10.71% 12.50% 1.79 17% 17.65% 16.36% -1.29 -7%
PL 10.71% 12.50% 1.79 17% 11.76% 9.09% -2.67 -23%
Non-Partisan EB Members Partisan EB Members
Variation : Voting Power (%) : Variation :
Non-Partisan EB Members Partisan EB Members
Table 4:
Effect of Germany's Shift from Partition 3 to Partition 1
On Voting Power of EMU Member Countries
(A) Measured by SSI











(B) Measured by SBI
Partisan EB Members






















Voting Power (%) :
Non-Partisan EB Members
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The effect of Portugal’s shift, ceteris paribus, from a neutral monetary-policy stance to an
expansionary one is detailed in Table 6. When EB members are non-partisan, this shift is simply
neutral for all voters, including Portugal itself: before the shift, it already benefited (just like Italy)
from potential associations with any voter in the expansionary partition, and given the number of
weights claimed by the voters in that partition (including EMU-11), all the neutral-minded and
expansionary-minded voters already shared total voting power (and policy impact) between
themselves. Instead, when EB members are partisan, the situation is paradoxical: all countries with
an expansionary stance would prefer Portugal to switch from neutral to expansionary, since that
would increase their individual voting power by 30% (policy impact: +17%); but Portugal itself, as
well as all other EMU countries (except Ireland), would lose out as a result of that shift.
On the whole, therefore, the simulations seem to support the intuition that, when EB members are
partisan (i.e. vote along national rather than EMU-wide lines), if a country with 2 of its nationals
sitting at the GC (like Germany or the Netherlands) shifts its a priori monetary-policy stance, those
EMU member countries which share that country’s new stance (and the country itself) are
systematically better off, and those which either used to share that country’s stance, or do not share
its stance both before and after the shift, are systematically worse off (in voting-power terms).
However, when EB members are not partisan, it may not even be in the country’s own interest to
shift its stance, and the countries who share its new stance may end up losing some power, while the
countries who used to share its preferences could see their power increase. Furthermore, even when
EB members are considered partisan, a country with no EB representative (i.e. with only 1 vote,
compared to 2 for those with an EB representative) and a neutral a priori monetary-policy stance
can, by shifting that stance, have a non-negligible effect on the voting power of its fellow-EMU
members, although paradoxically, this may not be in its own interest.
V.3. PREFERRED COALITION PATTERNS
The first subsection provided us with a first few suggestions as to which type of coalition each
EMU member country would prefer, in terms of voting power; at least, it allowed us to determine
the cases (i.e. the scenarios) in which a country’s power was increased or reduced by the
partisanship of EB members. This subsection examines each country’s “most-” and “least-
preferred” situations, i.e. the coalition pattern(s) which endow(s) each of them with, respectively,




















NL 0.00% 7.14% 7.14 NA 7.80% 16.67% 8.87 114%
D 8.93% 7.14% -1.79 -20% 11.93% 16.67% 4.74 40%
F 8.93% 7.14% -1.79 -20% 11.93% 16.67% 4.74 40%
BE 8.93% 7.14% -1.79 -20% 6.88% 8.33% 1.45 21%
LX 8.93% 7.14% -1.79 -20% 6.88% 8.33% 1.45 21%
Ö 8.93% 7.14% -1.79 -20% 6.88% 8.33% 1.45 21%
EMU-11 37.50% 42.86% 5.36 14% -- -- -- --
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 0.00% -7.80 -100%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 0.00% -7.80 -100%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.75% 0.00% -2.75 -100%
IT 8.93% 7.14% -1.79 -20% 19.72% 16.67% -3.05 -15%



















NL 0.00% 5.43% 5.43 NA 7.32% 16.45% 9.13 125%
D 7.35% 5.43% -1.92 -26% 12.20% 16.45% 4.25 35%
F 7.35% 5.43% -1.92 -26% 12.20% 16.45% 4.25 35%
BE 7.35% 5.43% -1.92 -26% 7.32% 8.55% 1.23 17%
LX 7.35% 5.43% -1.92 -26% 7.32% 8.55% 1.23 17%
Ö 7.35% 5.43% -1.92 -26% 7.32% 8.55% 1.23 17%
EMU-11 48.53% 56.59% 8.06 17% -- -- -- --
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 0.00% -7.32 -100%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 0.00% -7.32 -100%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.44% 0.00% -2.44 -100%
IT 7.35% 5.43% -1.92 -26% 19.51% 16.45% -3.06 -16%



















NL 0.00% 9.38% 9.38 NA 5.88% 13.79% 7.91 135%
D 10.71% 9.38% -1.33 -12% 11.76% 13.79% 2.03 17%
F 10.71% 9.38% -1.33 -12% 11.76% 13.79% 2.03 17%
BE 10.71% 9.38% -1.33 -12% 8.82% 11.21% 2.39 27%
LX 10.71% 9.38% -1.33 -12% 8.82% 11.21% 2.39 27%
Ö 10.71% 9.38% -1.33 -12% 8.82% 11.21% 2.39 27%
EMU-11 25.00% 25.00% 0.00 0% -- -- -- --
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 0.00% -5.88 -100%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 0.00% -5.88 -100%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.94% 0.00% -2.94 -100%
IT 10.71% 9.38% -1.33 -12% 17.65% 13.79% -3.86 -22%
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Partisan EB Members







Voting Power (%) :
Variation : Voting Power (%) : Variation : Voting Power (%) :
Non-Partisan EB Members Partisan EB Members
Table 5:
Effect of the Netherlands's Shift from Partition 1 to Partition 3
On Voting Power of EMU Member Countries
(A) Measured by SSI
Voting Power (%) : Variation : Voting Power (%) : Variation :































PL 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 9.63% 8.93% -0.70 -7%
D 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 11.93% 15.48% 3.55 30%
F 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 11.93% 15.48% 3.55 30%
BE 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 6.88% 8.93% 2.05 30%
LX 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 6.88% 8.93% 2.05 30%
Ö 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 6.88% 8.93% 2.05 30%
EMU-11 37.50% 37.50% 0.00 0% -- -- -- --
Voter Left by
Shifting Country
IT 8.93% 8.93% 0.00 0% 19.72% 19.05% -0.67 -3%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 3.57% -4.23 -54%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 3.57% -4.23 -54%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.80% 3.57% -4.23 -54%



















PL 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 9.76% 9.38% -0.38 -4%
D 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 12.20% 15.63% 3.43 28%
F 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 12.20% 15.63% 3.43 28%
BE 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 7.32% 9.38% 2.06 28%
LX 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 7.32% 9.38% 2.06 28%
Ö 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 7.32% 9.38% 2.06 28%
EMU-11 48.53% 48.53% 0.00 0% -- -- -- --
Voter Left by
Shifting Country
IT 7.35% 7.35% 0.00 0% 19.51% 18.74% -0.77 -4%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 3.13% -4.19 -57%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 3.13% -4.19 -57%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 7.32% 3.13% -4.19 -57%



















PL 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 11.76% 10.34% -1.42 -12%
D 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 11.76% 13.79% 2.03 17%
F 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 11.76% 13.79% 2.03 17%
BE 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 8.82% 10.34% 1.52 17%
LX 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 8.82% 10.34% 1.52 17%
Ö 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 8.82% 10.34% 1.52 17%
EMU-11 25.00% 25.00% 0.00 0% -- -- -- --
Voter Left by
Shifting Country
IT 10.71% 10.71% 0.00 0% 17.65% 17.24% -0.41 -2%
NL 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 3.45% -2.43 -41%
FI 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 3.45% -2.43 -41%
SP 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 5.88% 3.45% -2.43 -41%
IR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 0% 2.94% 3.45% 0.51 17%
Variation :
Non-Partisan EB Members
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Partisan EB Members












Voting Power (%) :
Non-Partisan EB Members Partisan EB Members
Variation : Voting Power (%) : Variation :
Voting Power (%) : Variation : Voting Power (%) : Variation :
Non-Partisan EB Members Partisan EB Members
Table 6:
Effect of Portugal's Shift from Partition 2 to Partition 3
On Voting Power of EMU Member Countries
(A) Measured by SSIGabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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Tables 7 and 8 describe, respectively under the assumption of non-partisan and partisan EB
members, the circumstances in which each EMU member country maximises its voting power; they
also indicate how much voting power these circumstances allow it to gain with respect to the
baseline case (both in absolute and relative terms). With a non-partisan EB, it appears that France,
Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal all have a clear interest in advocating scenario M
+ S1: by making them all acceptable as coalition partners to EMU-11 and its 6 votes, this
partitioning would allow each of them to multiply their baseline voting power by a factor of 2.5 – 3
(and to increase their policy impact by 60%), providing them with the maximum voting power (and
policy impact) under this set of assumptions. Unsurprisingly, the 5 remaining countries would
rather see other scenarios in action, since that particular one leaves them with no power at all.
With EB members voting for their country of origin, differences start to appear between the most
impressive performances in terms of absolute voting power, and the strongest relative increases
with respect to the baseline scenario; 2 scenarios nevertheless stand out. On the one hand, Finland
and Ireland would prefer voters to be partitioned according to scenario G: it would endow the
former with a voting power of close to 20% (policy impact: 17.7%), an improvement of more than
60% on its baseline power (and almost double its baseline policy impact); and it would allow the
latter to increase its voting power by 70% (policy impact: +35%). On the other hand, and with
respectively the same arguments and figures, Italy and Portugal would prefer scenario M to prevail.
The reasons for these preferences have already been discussed at the beginning of this section.
Tables 9 and 10 list, for non-partisan and partisan EB members respectively, those coalition
pattern(s) which would leave each country with the lowest voting power, and also indicate how
much voting power each country loses with respect to the baseline case. When EB members rely on
EMU-wide averages, the results are simply an extension of the discussion of the most-preferred
scenario(s): whenever a country finds itself in the partition opposite to that which contains EMU-11
(most often Finland, Spain and Ireland, but depending on the “shifts” discussed above, also the
Netherlands and Germany), it loses all of its baseline voting power (or policy impact), since its
preferences are incompatible with average EMU preferences. With partisan EB members, countries
with 2 of their nationals sitting at the GC have more to lose than countries with only their NCB
Governor; but apart from the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and in particular Germany, whose worse
scenarios never imply a total loss of power with respect to the baseline case (and virtually no loss









Netherlands 4.55% 7.14% 2.59 57% M + S2
Germany 4.55% 8.93% 4.38 96% M ; M + S3
France 4.55% 11.11% 6.56 144% M + S1
Finland 4.55% 9.69% 5.14 113% G
Italy 4.55% 11.11% 6.56 144% M + S1
Spain 4.55% 4.55% 0.00 0% Baseline
Ireland 4.55% 9.69% 5.14 113% G
Belgium 4.55% 11.11% 6.56 144% M + S1
Luxembourg 4.55% 11.11% 6.56 144% M + S1
Austria 4.55% 11.11% 6.56 144% M + S1








Netherlands 3.10% 5.43% 2.33 75% M + S2
Germany 3.10% 7.35% 4.25 137% M ; M + S3
France 3.10% 9.80% 6.70 216% M + S1
Finland 3.10% 8.17% 5.07 164% G
Italy 3.10% 9.80% 6.70 216% M + S1
Spain 3.10% 3.27% 0.17 5% G
Ireland 3.10% 8.17% 5.07 164% G
Belgium 3.10% 9.80% 6.70 216% M + S1
Luxembourg 3.10% 9.80% 6.70 216% M + S1
Austria 3.10% 9.80% 6.70 216% M + S1








Netherlands 7.79% 9.38% 1.59 20% M + S2
Germany 7.79% 10.71% 2.92 37% M ; M + S3
France 7.79% 12.50% 4.71 60% M + S1
Finland 7.79% 11.36% 3.57 46% G
Italy 7.79% 12.50% 4.71 60% M + S1
Spain 7.79% 7.79% 0.00 0% Baseline
Ireland 7.79% 11.36% 3.57 46% G
Belgium 7.79% 12.50% 4.71 60% M + S1
Luxembourg 7.79% 12.50% 4.71 60% M + S1
Austria 7.79% 12.50% 4.71 60% M + S1
Portugal 7.79% 12.50% 4.71 60% M + S1
Voting Power (%) :
Preferred Outcome by Country
With Non-Partisan EB Members





Gain w. r. to Baseline :
Gain w. r. to Baseline :
(B) Measured by SBI
Voting Power (%) : Scenario(s)
Leading to
Preferred Outcome
(C) Measured by HPI
Voting Power (%) : Scenario(s)
Leading to
Preferred Outcome









Netherlands 11.98% 17.21% 5.23 44% M + S1
Germany 11.98% 17.21% 5.23 44% M + S1
France 11.98% 16.67% 4.69 39% M + S2
Finland 11.98% 19.72% 7.74 65% G
Italy 11.98% 19.72% 7.74 65% M
Spain 11.98% 17.21% 5.23 44% M + S1
Ireland 5.63% 9.63% 4.00 71% G
Belgium 5.63% 8.93% 3.30 59% M + S3
Luxembourg 5.63% 8.93% 3.30 59% M + S3
Austria 5.63% 8.93% 3.30 59% M + S3








Netherlands 11.88% 17.33% 5.45 46% M + S1
Germany 11.88% 17.33% 5.45 46% M + S1
France 11.88% 16.45% 4.57 38% M + S2
Finland 11.88% 19.51% 7.63 64% G
Italy 11.88% 19.51% 7.63 64% M
Spain 11.88% 17.33% 5.45 46% M + S1
Ireland 5.75% 9.76% 4.01 70% G
Belgium 5.75% 9.38% 3.63 63% M + S3
Luxembourg 5.75% 9.38% 3.63 63% M + S3
Austria 5.75% 9.38% 3.63 63% M + S3








Netherlands 9.36% 16.36% 7.00 75% M + S1
Germany 9.36% 16.36% 7.00 75% M + S1
France 9.36% 13.79% 4.43 47% M + S2 ; M + S3
Finland 9.36% 17.65% 8.29 89% G
Italy 9.36% 17.65% 8.29 89% M
Spain 9.36% 16.36% 7.00 75% M + S1
Ireland 8.77% 11.76% 2.99 34% G
Belgium 8.77% 11.21% 2.44 28% M + S2
Luxembourg 8.77% 11.21% 2.44 28% M + S2
Austria 8.77% 11.21% 2.44 28% M + S2
Portugal 8.77% 11.76% 2.99 34% M
Gain w. r. to Baseline :
Gain w. r. to Baseline :
(B) Measured by SBI
Voting Power (%) : Scenario(s)
Leading to
Preferred Outcome
(C) Measured by HPI




Gain w. r. to Baseline : Voting Power (%) :
Preferred Outcome by Country
With Partisan EB Members
(A) Measured by SSI
Scenario(s)
Leading to









Netherlands 4.55% 0.00% -4.55 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S3
Germany 4.55% 0.00% -4.55 -100% M + S1
France 4.55% 3.88% -0.67 -15% G
Finland 4.55% 0.00% -4.55 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Italy 4.55% 3.88% -0.67 -15% G
Spain 4.55% 0.00% -4.55 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Ireland 4.55% 0.00% -4.55 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Belgium 4.55% 4.55% 0.00 0% Baseline
Luxembourg 4.55% 4.55% 0.00 0% Baseline
Austria 4.55% 4.55% 0.00 0% Baseline








Netherlands 3.10% 0.00% -3.10 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S3
Germany 3.10% 0.00% -3.10 -100% M + S1
France 3.10% 3.10% 0.00 0% Baseline
Finland 3.10% 0.00% -3.10 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Italy 3.10% 3.10% 0.00 0% Baseline
Spain 3.10% 0.00% -3.10 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Ireland 3.10% 0.00% -3.10 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Belgium 3.10% 3.10% 0.00 0% Baseline
Luxembourg 3.10% 3.10% 0.00 0% Baseline
Austria 3.10% 3.10% 0.00 0% Baseline








Netherlands 7.79% 0.00% -7.79 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S3
Germany 7.79% 0.00% -7.79 -100% M + S1
France 7.79% 4.55% -3.24 -42% G
Finland 7.79% 0.00% -7.79 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Italy 7.79% 4.55% -3.24 -42% G
Spain 7.79% 0.00% -7.79 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Ireland 7.79% 0.00% -7.79 -100% M ; M + S1 ; M + S2 ; M + S3
Belgium 7.79% 6.82% -0.97 -12% G
Luxembourg 7.79% 6.82% -0.97 -12% G
Austria 7.79% 6.82% -0.97 -12% G
Portugal 7.79% 4.55% -3.24 -42% G
Loss w. r. to Baseline : Voting Power (%) :
Least-Favourite Outcome by Country
With Non-Partisan EB Members











Loss w. r. to Baseline :
Loss w. r. to Baseline :
(B) Measured by SBI
Voting Power (%) :
(C) Measured by HPI









Netherlands 11.98% 3.57% -8.41 -70% M + S3
Germany 11.98% 11.93% -0.05 0% M ; G
France 11.98% 0.00% -11.98 -100% M + S1
Finland 11.98% 0.00% -11.98 -100% M + S2
Italy 11.98% 7.80% -4.18 -35% G
Spain 11.98% 0.00% -11.98 -100% M + S2
Ireland 5.63% 0.00% -5.63 -100% M + S2
Belgium 5.63% 0.00% -5.63 -100% M + S1
Luxembourg 5.63% 0.00% -5.63 -100% M + S1
Austria 5.63% 0.00% -5.63 -100% M + S1








Netherlands 11.88% 3.13% -8.75 -74% M + S3
Germany 11.88% 11.88% 0.00 0% Baseline
France 11.88% 0.00% -11.88 -100% M + S1
Finland 11.88% 0.00% -11.88 -100% M + S2
Italy 11.88% 7.32% -4.56 -38% G
Spain 11.88% 0.00% -11.88 -100% M + S2
Ireland 5.75% 0.00% -5.75 -100% M + S2
Belgium 5.75% 0.00% -5.75 -100% M + S1
Luxembourg 5.75% 0.00% -5.75 -100% M + S1
Austria 5.75% 0.00% -5.75 -100% M + S1








Netherlands 9.36% 3.45% -5.91 -63% M + S3
Germany 9.36% 9.36% 0.00 0% Baseline
France 9.36% 0.00% -9.36 -100% M + S1
Finland 9.36% 0.00% -9.36 -100% M + S2
Italy 9.36% 5.88% -3.48 -37% G
Spain 9.36% 0.00% -9.36 -100% M + S2
Ireland 8.77% 0.00% -8.77 -100% M + S2
Belgium 8.77% 0.00% -8.77 -100% M + S1
Luxembourg 8.77% 0.00% -8.77 -100% M + S1
Austria 8.77% 0.00% -8.77 -100% M + S1











Loss w. r. to Baseline :
Loss w. r. to Baseline :
(B) Measured by SBI
Voting Power (%) :
(C) Measured by HPI
Voting Power (%) :
Loss w. r. to Baseline : Voting Power (%) :
Least-Preferred Outcome by Country
With Partisan EB Members
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper was focused on the implications of the ECB’s structural characteristics for the relative
voting power of EMU member countries, and hence on the effectiveness of a common European
monetary policy. Its main conclusions are as follows.
When the structural features of monetary policy-making in EMU are appropriately examined, it
becomes obvious that, contrary to what some informal discussions of European monetary policy-
making seem to assume, it definitely does not matter for an EMU member’s a priori voting power
whether it is “small” or “big” (e.g. in terms of relative real GDP). Furthermore, the theoretical
power that each such member country can expect to exert on common monetary-policy decisions is
generally very poorly related to the number of votes it can claim to hold in the ECB’s Governing
Council, in particular when a priori coalition formation is taken into account.
According to this paper’s simulations, it is not at all clear that the 6 countries which managed to
elect one of their nationals at the ECB’s Executive Board always have a clear interest in pressing
these 6 members to vote along national rather than EMU-wide lines. These simulations do not
support either the intuition that EMU member countries with no representative at the Executive
Board are necessarily worse off (from a voting-power perspective) when each Executive Board’s
member focuses on his or her own country’s developments, rather than on EMU-wide aggregates. It
seems that these intuitions do not take into account the potential coalition-formation tendency of
Governing Council members, and the voting-power consequences of this tendency.
When the 6-member Executive Board is assumed to vote on the course of European monetary
policy with EMU-wide averages in mind, and even when no a priori partitioning of voters is
postulated, it can claim between 50% and 66% voting power (depending on the index used), while
the equivalent for each country individually is only 3.1% – 4.6%. Therefore, relying on appropriate
measures of voting power, it is possible to show that in those circumstances, national interests are
not over-represented at the ECB, even with 11 votes out of 17, since a euro zone-oriented Executive
Board enjoys significantly more voting power than its number of votes would imply (6 out of 17,
i.e. 35.3%), while each member country finds itself with only half to three-quarters as much voting
power as its individual number of votes would imply (1 out of 17, i.e. 5.9%). However, in the same
circumstances but using a measure of “policy impact”, the influence of the Executive Board falls to
just 14.3%, while each country claims as much as 7.8%, which, in sharp contrast with the
conclusions reached when examining voting power, is respectively significantly less and
significantly more than their respective number of votes would imply.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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On the whole, the simulations do seem to support the intuition that, provided that Executive Board
members vote along national rather than EMU-wide lines, when a country with 2 of its nationals
sitting at the Governing Council shifts its a priori monetary-policy stance, those EMU member
countries which share that country’s new stance (and the country itself) are systematically better off
in voting-power terms, while those which either used to share that country’s stance, or do not share
its stance both before and after the shift, are systematically worse off. However, under the same set
of assumptions, even a country with no Executive Board representative (i.e. with only 1 vote,
compared to 2 for those with an Executive Board representative) and a neutral a priori monetary-
policy stance can, by shifting that stance, have a non-negligible effect on the voting power of its
fellow-EMU members. Furthermore, when Executive Board members focus on EMU-wide
aggregates, it may not be in a country’s own interest to shift its a priori stance, and the countries
who share its new inclinations may end up losing some power, while the countries who used to
share its preferences could see their power increase as a result of the shift.
Despite its partial reliance on specific assumptions about the future course of European monetary
policy, it is hoped that this paper has managed to clarify, and constructively contribute to, the
debate on the effectiveness of the ECB’s decision-making process.Gabriel Mangano Monetary Policy in EMU: A Voting-Power Analysis
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APPENDIX 3
Countries with No EB Representative
Effect of EB Members' Partisanship
On EMU Members' Voting Power (measured by SSI)
Countries with EB Representative
Baseline
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Countries with No EB Representative
Effect of EB Members' Partisanship
On EMU Members' Voting Power (measured by SBI)
Countries with EB Representative
Baseline
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Countries with No EB Representative
Effect of EB Members' Partisanship
On EMU Members' Voting Power (measured by HPI)
Countries with EB Representative
Baseline
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Non-Partisan EB Members:
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Non-Partisan EB Members:
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Partisan EB Members:
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Partisan EB Members:
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Partisan EB Members:
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